How increased product market competition may be reshaping America's labor markets by John V. Duca
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In recent years, inflation has drifted lower
as the unemployment rate has fallen below 
trigger levels that have been associated with 
rising inflation. Indeed, since mid-1996 the
unemployment rate has been 5 percent or
lower—well below the 5.5 percent to 6 percent
trigger-point estimates of many economists—
while core inflation has remained low.
1 Al-
though wage inflation has drifted higher and
worker shortages abound, there is less upward
wage pressure than prior experience would
suggest.
These developments have spurred a reex-
amination of the view that there is a trigger level
of unemployment, below which inflation tends
to rise and above which inflation tends to fall
(see Phelps 1967; Friedman 1968). This trigger
level is called the nonaccelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Some critics
argue that the concept should be abandoned
(Galbraith 1997), while others argue that the
NAIRU is so imprecisely estimated it has 
limited use as a policy guide (Staiger, Stock, and
Watson 1997). However, these critics do not
shed light on why the relationship between
unemployment and changes in inflation has
apparently shifted. Others maintain that the
NAIRU needs to be modified for factors such as
changing demographics (see Gordon 1997),
sociological changes (Blanchard and Katz 1997),
or the impact of unemployment spells on worker
skills (also known as hysteresis effects; see
Blanchard and Katz 1997). The weaknesses of
these conclusions are that demographic adjust-
ments to the unemployment rate cannot explain
the behavior of the 1990s, sociological factors
are difficult to track, and the evidence on hys-
teresis effects for the United States is weak.
Another shortcoming of these arguments
for modifying the NAIRU is that they are incon-
sistent with both the U.S. economy’s perfor-
mance in the 1990s and the perceptions of firms
and workers about why the relationship be-
tween inflation and unemployment may have
changed. For example, while inflation, GDP
growth, and unemployment imply that the U.S.
economy has performed well at a macroeco-
nomic level in the mid-1990s, there has been an
increased sense of job insecurity at the firm 
or industry level, after adjusting for different
phases of the business cycle.
An alternative explanation for the combi-
nation of these macro- and microlevel develop-
ments is that we are in a new era in which
technological innovation and global trade are
curtailing inflation. Under this new paradigm,
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imports from higher worldwide capacity and (2)
innovations that boost productivity.
The jury is still out on these two sources.
First, although import prices have fallen, much
of the drop is a result of a stronger dollar and
declining oil prices. Consequently, it is difficult
to decipher any impact of global capacity.
Second, it is not yet clear that long-run produc-
tivity growth has risen above its post-1972 aver-
age. Even if statistics understate growth in
productivity, an upward shift in productivity
growth does not necessarily mean that the
NAIRU is lower. Faster productivity growth may
initially offset increasing wage growth resulting
from low rates of unemployment. However, the
NAIRU hypothesis implies that keeping unem-
ployment at current levels will spur continued
increases in wage growth that eventually will
more than offset the higher level of productivity
growth and will boost inflation.
2
Another explanation for the combination
of low unemployment and low inflation is 
that fiercer product market competition has
restrained firms from hiking prices and wages
and is inducing firms to change the ways they
employ and pay workers. This explanation is
sometimes associated with “new paradigm”
arguments, but it is not based on faster produc-
tivity growth (Duca 1998). The “competition”
explanation is consistent with reports from
Federal Reserve Beige Book respondents (see
the box entitled “Federal Reserve Beige Book
Reports of Competition and Inflation”). This 
article reviews how and why increased product
market competition may be reshaping America’s
labor markets.
The analysis focuses on three important
trends in U.S. labor markets. The first is the
declining use of medium-term nominal wage
contracts. This trend is evidenced by the falling
share of private workers represented by unions,
which negotiate labor contracts that typically 
set future nominal wages (Figure 1).
3 Another
important trend has been a decline in the share
of union contracts that index or adjust wages for
inflation according to a preset formula. As
Figure 2 indicates, inflation risk, as tracked by
the percent change in the U.S. Consumer Price
Index (CPI), is positively correlated with the use
of indexation. The drop in inflation since the
early 1980s likely explains much of the decline
in indexation—especially in the 1980s (Holland
1995). However, inflation is not the only factor
behind this decline because inflation in the
early 1990s was at levels near those of the
1950s, while indexation was twice as prevalent
in the earlier period. Duca and VanHoose
(forthcoming b) provide theoretical arguments
and evidence that this difference may reflect a
greater degree of product market competition.
The third significant trend has been the rise of
profit sharing (Duca and VanHoose, forthcom-
ing a), as shown in Figure 3, which plots the
incidence of profit sharing in pension plans (Bell
Federal Reserve Beige Book Reports 
of Competition and Inflation
Several Federal Reserve Beige Book reports are consistent with the view that
heightened competition has curtailed inflation in recent years. While the anecdotal
reports are suggestive and are not sufficient evidence alone, they are consistent with
the view that the degree of competition is higher now than in previous expansions.
With this in mind, consider the following noteworthy excerpts from recent Beige
Books covering the mid-1990s:
Manufacturers note that competitive pressures are restraining prices for
most products. (April 1994, iii)
Most Districts report that competitive pressures continue to temper price
increases on the output side. (June 1994, iv)
Price increases are noted among a broad range of business materials....
However, virtually all Districts report that competitive pressures are holding
prices down at the retail level.... (July 1994, ii–iii)
Industrial materials prices edged up further, but businesses say that com-
petitive pressures continue to restrain price increases on finished goods.
(September 1994, i)
Chicago, Kansas City, and Dallas report that intense competition among
retailers kept prices flat despite increased input costs. (March 1995, v)
Contacts in the temporary services industry said despite wage pressures
they could not raise fees because of fierce competition. (November 1995, v)
Competition continues to drive down retail prices in mall stores. (Boston
District, November 1995, I-1)
Several districts attribute the modest size of upward price movements to
competitive conditions. (March 1996, iii)
Figure 1
Unions on the Decline
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Duca and VanHoose (1998b).4
and Kruse 1995). Together, these trends can be
viewed as making work and pay more sensitive
to market conditions (Duca 1998).
I begin with a discussion of the theoretical
intuition for how changes in the degree of prod-
uct market competition may have spurred these
changes in labor practices. I then review and
interpret empirical evidence on these theoretical
implications.
THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN LABOR PRACTICES
AND THE DEGREE OF MARKET COMPETITION
To analyze how goods market competition
may affect labor practices, this article draws on
several papers by Duca and VanHoose (1991,
1998a, forthcoming a, and forthcoming b), who
combine the multisector frameworks of Blinder
and Mankiw (1984) and Duca (1987) with the
monopolistic competition framework of Ball
(1988). The multisector approach permits the
analysis of sectoral as well as aggregate shocks
and allows for heterogeneity in labor practices.
Thus, it is flexible enough to analyze how dif-
ferent susceptibility to sectoral shocks may
affect pay practices and why some sectors may
adopt nominal wage contracts or index such
contracts for inflation while others do not.
Incorporating Ball’s monopolistic competition
framework permits the analysis of how labor
practices are affected by changes in the overall
price elasticity of demand. The greater this elas-
ticity, the greater the extent to which firms 
compete in product markets. Thus, by combin-
ing aspects of multisector and monopolistic
competition frameworks, it is possible to ana-
lyze how changes in the degree of product 
market competition can affect labor practices in
a world where firms face aggregate and industry-
specific shocks.
Rather than rederiving the results of other
papers, the section below describes the basic
theoretical framework common to these studies
and then reviews the intuition behind key find-
ings on contracts, indexation, and profit sharing,
using charts or simple equations.
Basic Theoretical Framework
The economy contains a continuum of
sectors, indexed by j, that are distributed uni-
formly between one and zero, which allows for
aggregation of sector outputs. Each sector con-
tains a large number of representative firms and
workers, and relationships are expressed in logs
(lowercase letters) with constants suppressed. 
A representative firm in sector j produces out-
put (y) with employment (l ) according to
(1) yj = alj + q,
where 0 < a < l, and q is an aggregate supply
shock raising output per hour in all sectors.
Following Ball, assume that the demand
for a firm’s output in sector j (yj) as a share of
total output (y) depends on relative prices
according to the log-linear equation
(2) yj – y = –e(pj – p) + dj,
where e is the absolute size of the price elas-
ticity of demand, the aggregate price level 
(P) = (òPj
(1–e)dj)
1/(1–e), the log of the price level (p)
= òpjdj, and dj reflects sector-specific (independ-
ently and identically distributed) demand shocks
that sum to zero.
Figure 2
Fewer Union Contracts Are Indexed for
Inflation Than in the 1950s




















SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 3
The Rise of Profit Sharing and 
Goods Market Competition
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For simplicity, aggregate demand accords
with the quantity theory of money
(3) y = m + v – p,
where m is the log of the money stock and v is
a velocity shock common to all sectors. The
shock to aggregate demand shock is (m + v),
but for simplicity, money shocks are zeroed out
to reduce notation and avoid adding complica-
tions associated with different monetary policy
rules. For simplicity, each of the aggregate
shock variables (q and v) has an expected value
equaling zero in logs, is independently and
identically distributed, and has a fixed variance
(s
2
q for q and s
2
v for v).
Sectors differ in how much sectoral
demand shock variance they face, which is
assumed to equal s
2
d(1 – j)/j. Because the index
number j is distributed normally between zero 
and one, the sectoral demand shock variances
range from infinity for sector j = 0 to zero for
sector j = 1.
Converting Equations 1 through 3 into lev-
els, combining the resulting terms into an
expression for profits (pj = PjYj –WjLj), and dif-
ferentiating implies labor demand is
(4) lj
d = [–e(wj – pj) + (v + dj – pj)
+ (e – 1)q]/[a + e – ae].
The first term in the numerator reflects that
labor demand is declining in the nominal wage
but increasing in terms of the sector-specific
price. The second term reflects that labor
demand rises to the extent that aggregate
demand shocks boost overall prices relative to
the sector j price or that sectoral demand
shocks raise the relative demand for sector j’s
output. The last term in the numerator implies
that a supply shock that raises productivity will
boost labor demand. To make the model solv-
able, assume that labor is immobile across sec-
tors in the short run owing to specialization and




where c is a parameter > 0, reflecting that labor
supply depends on the real purchasing power
of wages. Equations 4 and 5 yield a reduced-
form solution for the market-clearing wage,
which reflects a balance between labor supply
and labor demand, where the former depends
on the real wage and the latter depends on the
marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) in
that industry. As goods markets become more
competitive,  e is higher and labor demand
becomes more sensitive to the MRPL. Conse-
quently, the market-clearing wage in an indus-
try depends more on supply shocks and sec-
toral demand shocks affecting the MRPL and
less on the real purchasing power of wages (see
Duca and VanHoose 1991).
Illustrative Arguments
A firm’s labor demand depends on the
change in total revenue due to a small change
in labor hired. Under perfect competition, labor
demand equals the price times the marginal
physical product of labor (MPPL). The MPPL is
related to the marginal cost of producing output
(MC), shown in the left panels of Figure 4. Since
the MPPL tends to fall as more labor is used,
holding other factors constant, the competitive
demand for labor (L
D
j ) is downward sloping
(upper right panel of Figure 4). Holding aggre-
gate prices and price expectations constant, the
labor-supply curve is upward sloping and shifts
in line with changes in aggregate prices or price
expectations. Since wages and employment reflect
both labor supply and demand, the competitive
outcome is given by point A. Under wage con-
tracts, firms employ as much labor as they de-
sire at a constant nominal wage that equals the
prior time period’s expectation (t – 1) of condi-
tions at time t: Et–1(wt). Thus, contracts replace
the spot labor-supply curve with a horizontal
wage-contract curve, which only shifts in period
t if a contract is indexed for inflation or profits.
Under imperfect competition (lower pan-
els), labor demand reflects the MRPL, which
equals the marginal revenue of one more unit of
output (MR) times the MPPL. Since boosting
output lowers prices for an imperfectly competi-
tive firm, marginal revenue is always below
price. Thus, such firms produce at an output
level below the perfect competition solution
such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost
(point  S; superscript SP denotes spot market
variable solutions).
Nominal Wage Contracting
To analyze the extent of nominal wage
contracting, assume that a share (W) of firms set
contracts in period t – 1 that cover period t and
set the nominal wage equal to the t – 1 expec-
tation of the next period’s market-clearing wage.
The remaining share (1 – W) of firms pays spot
market wages. For now, assume that contracts
are not indexed for inflation and there is no
profit sharing. In addition, assume that workers
choose between spot and contract wages to
minimize a weighted average of the expected
squared deviations of employment and the real
wage from their market-clearing levels. While
other loss functions are plausible, this assump-6
tion yields solutions that permit one to infer the
qualitative impact of altering either the degree
of market competition or the variances of the
different shocks under reasonable parameter
assumptions.
Solutions reveal that relative to spot
wages, wage contracts raise the exposure of real
wages to aggregate demand shocks but reduce
the exposure to sectoral demand shocks.
Contracts also lower the variance of real wages
in the face of supply and sectoral demand
shocks but raise the variance of employment.
Thus, trade-offs emerge, and the extent of con-
tracting depends on how workers weigh real-
wage versus employment stability.
4 This model
yields an interior solution such that there is a
critical sector that is indifferent between using
contract or spot wages, with workers more
likely to opt for contracts in industries facing
above-average sectoral demand variance. This
Figure 4
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result arises for two reasons. First, for each sec-
tor, wage contracts introduce the same degree
of employment and real-wage instability in the
face of aggregate shocks. Second, since sectors
face differing degrees of sectoral demand vari-
ance, contracts pose more real-wage stability
relative to higher employment variance for
workers in sectors with high sectoral variance.
By assumption, the range of sectoral vari-
ance is so wide that workers in sector j = 0 face
an infinite sectoral variance and will always
choose to use contracts because the sectoral
variance dwarfs the variances of aggregate
shocks, whereas those in sector j = 1 face zero
sectoral variance and will never use contracts.
While these are theoretical extremes, the quali-
tative implications accord with the higher
unionization rates in more cyclical industries.
For some intermediate value of j, the sectoral
and aggregate shock variances balance out,
implying that there is some sector that is indif-
ferent between nominal wage contracts and
spot wages. This balance depends on the de-
gree of product market competition. As the
price elasticity of demand rises, the cost of
potential job losses induced by nominal wage
contracts rises relative to the benefits of real-
wage stability, thus reducing the net benefits of
wage contracts and causing some sectors to shift
from wage contracts to spot wages.
To analyze how the degree of competition
affects the extent of nominal wage contracts,
suppose that the price elasticity of demand
rises. On the one hand, this reduces the respon-
siveness of each firm’s price to a given-size
demand shock, implying that such shocks have
smaller effects on the marginal revenue product
(and labor demand) and on spot wages as prod-
uct demand becomes more price sensitive. At
the same time, the greater demand elasticity
implies that labor demand falls more in response
to a given gap between contract wages and lower
spot wages. As a result, greater goods market
competition lowers the net benefit of nominal
wage contracts in the face of sectoral demand
shocks by reducing the volatility in spot real
wages relative to the volatility of employment
under nominal wage contracts. On the other hand,
in the face of aggregate demand shocks, greater
competition implies that wage contracts pose
somewhat lower downside costs in terms of real
wage and employment volatility. However,
greater competition clearly boosts the degree 
to which labor demand responds to aggregate
supply shocks and thereby the extent to which
contracts boost the volatility of employment—a
key downside cost of contracts.
To demonstrate these results, focus on the
case in the upper panels of Figure 5, where the
economy starts in a zero shock equilibrium
(point  O) and the price elasticity of demand is
low. Suppose an unanticipated sectoral demand
shock puts downward pressure on the price of
industry j’s product but has no effect on overall
prices. Since aggregate prices and price expec-
tations are unaffected, the labor-supply curve is
unaffected. However, the drop in the relative
demand for industry j’s product shifts the de-
mand and marginal revenue curves for industry
j left (shift 1). Since profit-maximizing firms pro-
duce at levels where marginal cost equals mar-
ginal revenue, output falls in the upper left
panel from Y
O
j (point O) to Y
SP
j if contracts are
not used. In labor markets, market-clearing or









j (point S), respec-
tively. However, if wage contracts are used,
employment falls further to L
C
j (point C), where
the marginal cost of labor equals its marginal
revenue product, and output falls further to Y
C
j.
Thus, nominal wage contracts protect real
wages from sectoral demand shocks but at the
cost of increased volatility of employment.
Now consider what happens under a high
price elasticity of demand, where the MRPL
(marginal revenue times MPPL) curve is flatter
and prices fall less. The MRPL curve in the
lower right panel shifts by less than in the upper
right panel. Despite the flatter slope of the
MRPL curve in the lower panel, it can be shown
that wages and employment fall by slightly less
than in the upper panel under each wage prac-
tice. Nevertheless, when relative demand shocks
occur, the flatter MRPL curve implies that less
real-wage stability is gained relative to extra
employment instability induced by using wage
contracts.
Now consider an aggregate demand shock
(left panels of Figure 6), where the analysis dif-
fers in that the labor-supply function shifts out
to the extent that a negative aggregate demand
shock lowers aggregate prices. For this reason,
the labor supply curve shifts right, leaving spot
employment unchanged at L
O
j, spot nominal
wages lower at W
SP
j, and spot real wages (W/P,
not shown) unchanged. Since contracts prevent
a decline in wages relative to sectoral demand
shocks, aggregate demand shocks induce bigger
employment and real-wage deviations from
spot market and initial values under wage con-
tracts. However, wage contracts pose less real-
wage volatility in the face of aggregate demand
shocks because such shocks affect prices less
under tougher market competition.the extent to which nominal contracts exacer-
bate employment losses when supply shocks
occur is much higher when competition is more
intense. Fundamentally, the fiercer the competi-
tion, the more falling spot wages cushion the
drop in output. Thus, the downside of using
contracts when supply shocks occur increases
as the price elasticity increases.
In summary, on the one hand, greater
competition slightly lowers the downside risk of
using contracts in the face of aggregate demand
shocks. On the other hand, it also cuts the net
benefit of contracts when sectoral demand
shocks occur and clearly raises the disincentive
to contract because of supply shocks. If sectoral
8
In contrast, the downside costs of wage
contracts stemming from aggregate supply
shocks are much greater when product markets
are more competitive. Consider a negative
aggregate supply shock that shifts the MRPL
curves of every industry inward by a given dis-
tance (right panels of Figure 6, shift 1). In addi-
tion, the aggregate supply shock causes an
overall rise in prices, which induces an upward
shift (shift 2) in the spot labor supply curve
equal to the aggregate rise in prices. Spot wages









j (point S), respectively, while con-
tract employment falls further to L
C
j (point C).
Comparing the upper and lower right panels,
Figure 5
Negative Sectoral Demand Shock and Nominal Wage Contracts
Low Price Elasticity of Demand
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demand and aggregate supply shocks are large
enough relative to aggregate demand shocks,
then use of nominal wage contracts will
arguably fall as the degree of product market
competition rises.
Wage Indexation
Thus far I have assumed that workers and
firms choose only between spot wages or wages
that are set ahead of market conditions. In practice
some contracts include clauses that adjust wages
for inflation or profits, according to a previously
arranged formula. For now, consider whether a
firm indexes nominal wages for inflation.
Indexation protects real contract wages
from aggregate demand variations by keeping
contract wages close to their market-clearing
level, which moves with inflation. The intuition
behind this result is that an expansionary aggre-
gate demand shock will push up inflation and
the spot nominal wage. Hence, indexation helps
limit deviations of contract wages from market-
clearing wages when aggregate demand shocks
occur. However, as Gray (1976) shows, indexa-
tion moves contract wages further from their 
full information level when aggregate supply
shocks happen. Intuitively, a negative aggregate
supply shock boosts inflation and lowers the
Figure 6
Negative Aggregate Shocks and Nominal Wage Contracts
Aggregate Demand Shock
Low Degree of Competition
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real marginal product of labor. In such cases,
the spot real wage would fall, whereas cost-of-
living escalator clauses would prevent a decline
in the real contract wage toward its new spot
market level. As a result, the presence of aggre-
gate supply shocks makes incomplete indexa-
tion optimal, and a trade-off emerges in which
indexation is more attractive the greater the ex
ante variance of aggregate demand shocks rela-
tive to the ex ante variance of aggregate supply
shocks.
For plausible variation in aggregate
demand and supply shocks, this trade-off
implies that a sector exists that is indifferent
between indexing and not indexing. Suppose
the degree of product market competition rises.
Then each firm’s price and marginal product 
of labor curve become less sensitive to aggre-
gate demand variations. Thus, employment at
contract firms is also less sensitive to demand
shocks, reducing the incentive to index. In-
creased competition also means that aggregate
supply shocks pose greater downside costs in
the form of employment losses from indexing
wages.
In analyzing the impact of the degree of
competition on indexation choices, it is relevant
to consider aggregate rather than sectoral
shocks because, by definition, only aggregate
shocks affect the overall price level. For ease of
exposition, comparisons are made between
nonindexed wage contracts and contracts fully
indexed for inflation.
First, consider a negative aggregate de-
mand shock that shifts the MRPL curve leftward
(left panels of Figure 7, shift 1). The flatter slope
of the marginal revenue curves in the high price
elasticity case (lower panel) implies a smaller
shift of the MRPL curve. Because indexation
shifts the wage-contract curve (W
C
j) down (shift
3) in line with the shifts in the MRPL curves and
spot labor-supply curve (shift 2), work hours
and real wages are unaffected whether the price
elasticity is high or low (depicted by point I ).
However, if contract wages are not in-
dexed, these inward shifts imply a decline in
employment and a rise in real wages (depicted
by point C in both left-hand panels) because the
wage contract curve does not move. The extent
to which either employment or real wages are
affected by not indexing can thus be seen as
proportional to the benefit of indexing. Suppose
the price elasticity of demand is relatively low,
as in the upper left panel. If contract wages are
not indexed, then employment falls by the gap
between  L
O
j and  L
C
j in the upper left panel 





j since prices fall by that magnitude. But
when demand is more elastic (lower left panel),
the drop in contract employment and the
change in the real contract wage are smaller.
This occurs because the MRPL curve shifts less
in response to aggregate demand shocks when
demand is more elastic. Thus, the fiercer the
degree of goods market competition, the lower
the incentive is to index in the face of aggregate
demand shocks because indexing poses smaller
benefits.
To analyze the downside cost of indexing
when aggregate supply shocks occur, consider
a common supply disturbance that shifts the
MRPL curves downward, shown in the right
panels of Figure 7 (shift 1). Under indexation,
the higher price level would shift the wage
curves in these panels upward (shift 3) so that
the nominal wage would rise as much as the
overall price level, leaving the real wage
unchanged if employment remained at L
O
j.
However, because labor demand has shifted left
(shift 1), the nominal spot wage (W
SP
j at point S)
is below the level that maintains a constant real
wage (W
I
j at point I ). If contracts are not
indexed, the labor-supply curve does not shift
and employment falls to Lc
j (point C ). However,
if contract wages were indexed for inflation, the
wage-contract curve (right panels) would shift
up so that the real wage would be unchanged
(point I ), inducing a rise in wages to W
I
j and a
bigger fall in employment to L
I
j. While aggregate
supply shocks cause employment under wage
contracts to deviate from its market-clearing
level in both cases, the deviation is larger under
indexation. In addition, the greater the degree
of market competition, the flatter the MRPL
curve is (lower left panel) and the more index-
ation pushes employment and wages from their
full information levels (point S).
Since increased employment variation in
the face of aggregate supply shocks is the major
downside cost of indexing and less employ-
ment/real-wage variation in the face of aggre-
gate demand shocks is the major benefit, there
is less incentive to index when the degree of
product competition is greater. As a result, the
prevalence of indexation clauses in nominal
wage contracts should fall as the degree of
product market competition rises.
Profit Sharing
To analyze how increased product market
competition affects the incidence of profit 
sharing in labor contracts, assume that the share
of the labor force covered by contracts is con-
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b). As is standard in much of the wage indexa-
tion literature (Gray 1976; Karni 1983), assume
also that the optimal contract minimizes devia-
tions from the market-clearing wage and em-
ployment levels.
Under these conditions, the optimal wage
contract adjusts the contract wage to mimic the
spot wage, which equates labor supply with
labor demand. The market-clearing wage re-
flects that labor demand depends on the mar-
ginal product of labor in that industry and labor
supply depends on the real wage in terms of the
overall price level. A higher degree of product
market competition makes labor demand more
elastic, as represented by a larger magnitude of
e in Equation 4. As a result, equilibrium wages
and employment at firms with contracts become
more sensitive to changes in the MRPL that arise
from sectoral demand shifts. For this reason, the
relative degree to which spot market wages
reflect overall prices, rather than the sectoral
marginal product of labor, is higher the greater
the sensitivity of labor supply to the real wage
and the greater the significance of labor in pro-
duction. By contrast, profit sharing becomes
more important and inflation indexation less
appropriate as the extent of goods market com-
petition rises, which makes labor demand more
Figure 7
Negative Aggregate Shocks and Wage Indexation
Aggregate Demand Shock
Low Price Elasticity of Demand
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sensitive to the MRPL. Although the market-
clearing solution for sectoral wages is compli-
cated, as markets become perfectly competitive
(e®¥), the equilibrium wage implied by Equa-
tions 4 and 5 approaches
(6) wj = g(pj + q) + (1 – g)p,
where (pj + q) can be interpreted as the sector-
specific price adjusted for positive supply shocks,
g = 1/[c(1 – a) + 1] < 1 is the weight on the
MRPL in determining wages,
5 and (1 – g) is the
relative importance of overall prices for spot
wages.
In practice, one does not observe the
explicit indexation or adjustment of wages to
the MRPL in a particular industry, mainly
because it is difficult to measure and verify this
variable. However, as the degree of product
market competition rises, the MRPL moves more
in tandem with firm profits, a result formally
shown by Duca and VanHoose (forthcoming b).
Basically, greater competition reduces the
extent to which firms boost prices rather than
output when the relative demand for that sec-
tor’s product rises. As a result, wages and prof-
its more closely reflect the MRPL. For these
reasons, greater market competition boosts both
the incentive to index wages to the MRPL and
the desirability of using profit sharing as a
means of doing so.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PRODUCT MARKET
COMPETITION AND LABOR PRACTICES
Although increased product market com-
petition can theoretically affect labor practices,
there has been little empirical macro work on
this issue. The few related studies done before
the late 1990s were largely microeconomic stud-
ies that compared cross-sectional patterns of
unionization or wage determination with indus-
try patterns of market power. However, these
studies did not assess the impact of macroeco-
nomic factors. Inspired by Fischer (1977a,
1977b) and Gray (1976), empirical macroeco-
nomic studies of wages and indexation have
focused on traditional macroeconomic factors
(such as inflation and aggregate supply shocks)
but have ignored changes in market structure or
the degree of product market competition (for
example, see Ghosal and Loungani 1996).
Nominal Wage Contracts
The theoretical framework implies, under
the assumption of constant money growth, that
the use of nominal wage contracts is declining
in the variances of aggregate supply and
demand shocks and in the degree of product
market competition. Consistent with this model,
Duca and VanHoose (1998b) find that changes
in the unionized share of private-sector workers
(a proxy for nominal wage contracts) are nega-
tively related to the variance of real oil prices (a
proxy for the aggregate supply shock variance),
the inflation rate (a proxy for aggregate demand
shock variance), and the inverse of an adjusted
profit-share measure (a proxy for the degree of
goods market competition).
6
Changes in the cross-sectional pattern of
unionization also support the view that greater
market competition reduces the use of nominal
wage contracts. Some sectors are more suited to
such contracts than others due to sector-specific
conditions, which, at a point in time, can
account for differences in unionization across
industries. However, changes in how much
competition a sector faces relative to others may
explain why unionization rates have declined
faster in some sectors. Indeed, data available
since the early 1980s show that the largest
declines in unionization have been in sectors
facing increased foreign competition or in de-
regulated sectors (Figure 8).
7 Table 1 shows that
many U.S. industries have been deregulated
since the late 1970s, suggesting that competition
has become tougher in product markets, not
only for traded goods but also for nontraded
services. Note that most of the overall drop in
unionization since the early 1980s is the result
of falling unionization rates within sectors,
rather than shifts in jobs from more unionized
industries to less unionized ones.
8
The results are also consistent with a
“rent-sharing” theory of unions (Layard, Nickell,
Figure 8
Unionization Rates by Industry Groups











’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90 ’89 ’88 ’87 ’86 ’85 ’84 ’83
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       13 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1998
and Jackman 1994; Oswald 1982) and with
microeconomic studies that test for links
between firm monopoly power and unioniza-
tion (for citations, see Mason and Bain 1993).
According to the rent-sharing approach, imper-
fect competition or pricing power creates excess
profits for a firm, which gives workers an incen-
tive to incur the costs of unionizing. By forming
a union, current workers can restrict the poten-
tial entry of other workers and thereby gain
enough negotiating leverage to induce the 
firm to share excess profits by paying above-
market wages. However, if the market structure
changes so that new firms can more easily enter,
then excess profits are bid down and there are
fewer rents to share. From this perspective,
deregulation and foreign competition have
greatly reduced the economic benefits of union-
izing. The shortcoming of rent-sharing models
relative to the framework sketched here is that
existing rent-sharing models tend to ignore that
American unions generally negotiate only par-
tially inflation-indexed wage contracts whose
optimality is also affected by supply shocks. 
The advantage of the rent-sharing approach is
that its assumption of restricted labor supply
within a given sector can account for the 
tendency of union wages to be higher than
nonunion wages.
Wage Indexation
The theoretical model implies that the use
of indexation in wage contracts should be in-
creasing in the variance of aggregate demand
shocks, decreasing in the variance of aggregate
supply shocks, and decreasing in the degree 
of product market competition. Consistent with
these predictions, Duca and VanHoose (forth-
coming b) find that the overall incidence of
indexation clauses in union contracts is nega-
tively related to the variance of real oil prices,
positively correlated with the inflation rate 
and squared inflation expectation errors of
households, and negatively related to the in-
verse of an adjusted profit-share measure.
Indeed, Duca and VanHoose (forthcoming b)
find that changes in the overall use of indexa-
tion in contracts are better tracked by an empir-
ical model that adds the degree of product
market competition to a more conventional
empirical model having only measures of aggre-
gate supply and demand shock variances. As
with unionization rates, the cross-sectional pat-
tern of declines in indexation are most pro-
nounced in industries that either face foreign
competition or have been deregulated since the
late 1970s.
Profit Sharing
Profit sharing has risen dramatically since
the early 1980s, as seen in Figure 3. As shown
by Bell and Kruse (1995), most of these profit-
sharing provisions include employee stock own-
ership plans or profit-based contributions to
thrift plans but make relatively little use of non-
deferred forms of profit sharing, such as cash
bonuses.
Deferred profit sharing is more common
because most workers do not have sufficient
wealth to see their weekly take-home pay vary
with market conditions. They are, however, bet-
ter able to handle profit volatility over the long
run, such as in the form of variable, but cumu-
lative, contributions to their retirement accounts.
Nevertheless, recent salary and Federal Reserve
Beige Book surveys indicate that annual
base/hourly pay is increasingly being comple-
Table 1
Many U.S. Industries Have Been Deregulated Since the 1970s
SIC Industry* Major Deregulatory Steps
Agriculture —
Mining Oil and gas: oil prices deregulated by a series of 
presidential executive orders beginning in 1976;
natural gas prices deregulated by the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978.
Construction —
Manufacturing Increased openness to trade, partly from the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (1979, 1993), the
Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1989), and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (1994).
Transportation Trucking: truck rates liberalized in the late 1970s and
deregulated by the Motor Carrier Act (1980).
Airlines: the Airline Deregulation Act (1978) allowed
entry in 1982 and deregulated airfares in 1983.
Railroads: deregulated by Interstate Commerce
Commission liberalization of rail rates in the late 
1970s and the Staggers Rail Act (1981).
Communications Telephones: largely deregulated following the AT&T
court settlement of 1982.
Cable television: deregulated in a series of Federal
Communications Commission rulings in the late 1970s
and by the Cable Television Deregulation Act (1984).




FIRE (finance, insurance, Banking: partly deregulated by the Depository
and real estate) Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(1980) and the Garn–St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act (1982).
* Standard industry classification (SIC) of sectors at the one-digit-level classification code.
SOURCES: Winston (1993); author’s compilations.14
mented by variable cash bonuses. This shift sug-
gests that pay may be becoming more market
responsive in both the short run and long run.
The theoretical framework presented in
this article implies that under fiercer competi-
tion, profits are more closely aligned with 
workers’ market value, with profits more closely
reflecting prices minus unit labor costs (wage
costs adjusted for productivity). As a result,
profit sharing should trend upward with a mea-
sure of market competition, as seen in Figure 3,
where the competition measure rises as the rel-
ative demand for goods becomes more price
elastic. In this figure, the price elasticity of
demand is measured using the inverted after-tax
profit share of nonfinancial corporations,
adjusted for swings related to the business
cycle, oil prices, and exchange rates (Duca and
VanHoose, forthcoming a, forthcoming b).
Nevertheless, since available data cover a short
period and have a missing data point (1987), the
evidence is supportive, not conclusive. Thus, it
is unclear whether greater competition rather
than other factors has induced a rise in profit
sharing.
One way around this inference problem is
to compare deregulated or traded goods indus-
tries with others. Some sectors are more suited
to profit sharing than others because the nature
of work and the ability to monitor work vary
across sectors. Such factors would account for
why differences exist across sectors at a point in
time, while changes in the attitudes of different
generations might account for why profit shar-
ing has risen overall. However, changes in the
relative degree of competition across sectors
might account for why profit sharing has risen
more in some industries than in others. Indeed
the biggest increases in profit sharing through
1993 have occurred in sectors facing increased
foreign competition, such as manufacturing, or
in deregulated sectors, such as transportation
(Figure 9). While inconclusive, these trends are
loosely consistent with the view that more
intense product market competition is boosting
the use of profit sharing.
CONCLUSION
Fiercer product market competition can
theoretically reduce the prevalence of nominal
wage contracts and of indexation in such con-
tracts while boosting the use of profit sharing.
Arguably, product markets have generally
become more competitive in the United States
since the late 1970s, owing to increased foreign
competition in traded goods markets and the
deregulation of many nontraded sectors.
Consistent with this view, the after-tax profit
share of nonfinancial corporations has moved
within a lower range since the late 1970s, after
adjusting for swings in temporary factors and
net interest (Duca 1997).
Aggregate time-series evidence supports
the view that increased competition has
reduced the use of nominal contracts and index-
ation, as reflected in the declining rate of union-
ization and the falling incidence of CPI
indexation clauses in union contracts. Limited,
inconclusive data also support the view that
greater product market competition has boosted
the overall use of profit sharing. Consistent with
aggregate movements in labor practices and a
measure of the degree of goods market compe-
tition, industry-level data indicate that all three
of these trends are most evident in sectors that
have experienced either deregulation or in-
creased foreign competition since the late
1970s. While more research needs to be done,
particularly using industry-level data, new theo-
retical arguments and empirical evidence sup-
port—but do not conclusively prove—the view
that increased product market competition has
been reshaping America’s labor markets.
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Figure 9
Profit Sharing Rises in Manufacturing and
Deregulated Industries
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1 This is true if core inflation is adjusted for methodologi-
cal changes in recent years that have reduced the
extent to which statistics have overstated consumer
price inflation.
2 This may have occurred in the 1960s when a run-up 
in productivity growth initially offset rising wages stem-
ming from low unemployment, but eventually acceler-
ating wage growth overtook productivity growth,
causing unit labor costs and inflation to rise.
3 Accompanying this change has been an increased
use of temporary workers, a phenomenon examined
by Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997).
4 Nevertheless, the incidence of sectoral demand
shocks may reduce contracting in extreme cases in
which workers place much more emphasis on minimiz-
ing deviations from market-clearing employment than
on minimizing deviations from the expected real wage.
5 In logs, the MRPL equals marginal revenue (pj) plus
the marginal physical product of labor (the sum of the
two log-linear supply shocks).
6 Prior studies (Evans 1991; Holland 1986) have found
inflation uncertainty to be increasing in the level of
inflation, which is consistent with arguments for pursu-
ing price stability.
7 For details on deregulation, see Duca and VanHoose
(forthcoming a) and Winston (1993).
8 Following Duca and VanHoose (1998b), the time
series splices data from Troy and Sheflin (1985) with
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Similar trends
in unionization rates are evident in recent estimates 
by Freeman (1998).
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